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PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HOW WE USE IT
Lung-chu Chen*
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HoW WE USE IT.
By Rosalyn Higgins. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994.**
This superb book is the revised text of the author's widely acclaimed
lectures on the General Course in International Law delivered at the Hague
Academy in 1992. Although it is "neither a treatise nor a textbook," 1
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It is wide-
ranging in its coverage of major international law issues and thought-
provoking in its expression of the author's incisive views. One of the
world's leading international lawyers, Professor Higgins has sought to
demonstrate that "there is an essential and unavoidable choice to be made
between the perception of international law as a system of neutral rules,
and international law as a system of decision-making directed towards the
attainment of certain declared values." 2 Instead of "recounting all the
well-agreed principles of international law," she has "deliberately"
highlighted many of the "difficult and unanswered issues in international
law today."' At the outset, the author has made her choice and stand
crystal clear: "International law is not rules. "4 Rather, it is "a normative
system, harnessed to the achievement of common values." 5 Associating
herself with the Policy Science Approach (also known as the New Haven
* Professor of Law, The New York Law School.
** Published in the United States by Oxford University Press (New York: 1994. Pp.
256. Cloth $35.00; 1995. Pp. 256. Paper $19.95) (page citations are to the British
edition).
1. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT at vi (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id.
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School) developed by Professors Myres S. McDougal, Harold D.
Lasswell, and their associates,6 she emphasizes international law as "a
process"-"a continuing process of authoritative decisions."' Thus,
"[i]nternational law is the entire decision-making process, and not just the
reference to the trend of past decisions which are termed 'rules.' 8
In rejecting the conventional perception of international law as a body
of "rules," or "the truly neutral application of rules," 9 Professor Higgins
points out the necessity of choosing between "complementary or
competing norms" in particular circumstances.10 And such choices are to
be made in light of political and social contexts: "To remain 'legal' is not
to ignore everything that is not 'rules.' To remain 'legal' is to ensure that
decisions are made by those authorized to do so, with important guiding
reliance on past decisions, and with available choices being made on the
basis of community interests and for the promotion of common values."',
Thus, while law as "rules" requires the application of "outdated and
inappropriate norms," "law as process encourages interpretation and
choice that is more compatible with values we seek to promote and
objectives we seek to achieve."' 2
The explicit recognition of the inevitability of making such choices is
accompanied by the author's admonition concerning the stability of
community expectations: Approaching international law as a process
"entails harder work in identifying sources and applying norms, as nothing
is mechanistic and context is always important. But law as process does
not entail a rejection of that core predictability that is essential if law is to
perform its functions in society." 3 Since international law is "an
authoritative system of decision-making available in a decentralized system
to all authorized decision-makers," the author's focus of inquiry goes far
6. Candor requires the full disclosure of the reviewer's identification with the Policy
Science Approach (The New Haven School). See LuNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION
TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE ch. 1
(1989); see also MYRES S. MCDouGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1980).
7. HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 8.
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beyond the International Court of Justice, "hugely important though its
role is." 4
In addition to generally discussing what international law is, the
author also discusses, in chapter one, why international law is regarded as
binding and why states comply with the norms of international law, even
in the absence of a compulsion to do so. According to the author, norms
emerge either through express consent or because there is no opposition
to obligations being imposed in the absence of specific consent. The basis
of an obligation to adhere to these norms, she finds, rests upon
reciprocity. Because states generally "perceive a reciprocal advantage in
cautioning self-restraint," "[i]t is rarely in the national interest to violate
international law, even though there might be short-term advantages in
doing so."" 5
In the second chapter of Problems and Process, Professor Higgins
examines the provenance of international law. She maintains that "[t]he
question of sources is of critical importance"; 6 the continuing
jurisprudential and philosophical debates on the subject have much more
than an ar-ademic sigmficance. Such mtellectual exchanges are "an
admission of an uncertainty at the heart of the international legal system"
and "a damaging acknowledgement" of its inadequacies. 7 She adds that
until the answers to the question of the provenance of norms are more
settled, "we do not have the tools for rendering more certain the content
of particular norms.""
The author does not merely run through the sources listed in Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice-treaties, custom,
general principles, judicial decisions, and learned writings-but focuses
instead on a few of the central problems associated with these sources.
She gives special attention to the question of custom and the continuing
controversy over practice and opinio juris (the belief that a norm is
accepted as law), the legal effect of resolutions of international
organizations, and the overlap between treaty and custom. In ascertaining
the role of resolutions of international governmental organizations in the
norm-creating process, the author urges that reference be made to the
subject matter and binding or recommendatory character of such
resolutions, the majorities supporting their adoption, repeated practice in
14. Id. at 10-11.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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relation to them, and evidence of opinio juris. It is not apparent why the
author omits a discussion of "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," 19 clearly one of the more problematical sources of
international law.
In any event, the author has clearly shown that the answer to each of
the unresolved problems in international law depends in large part upon
how one looks at its sources as they bear on a particular subject. In
response to Thirlway's view that "international law is what the
International Court of Justice would declare it to be" and his "cautions
against a loose approach to the question of sources,"20 the author offers
the following conclusion: "If international law is what the International
Court of Justice is likely to say it will be (in Thirlway's definition),
then-all the intellectual arguments notwithstanding-the Court, as much
as the rest of us, is caught in the psychological moment: resolutions and
treaties apparently do matter." 2
Having dealt with the nature, function, and sources of international
law from the perspectives of policy and process, Professor Higgins has no
difficulty in dismissing the traditional subject-object dichotomy as having
"no credible reality" and "no functional purpose." 22 Instead, she has
clearly identified multiple participants in the decentralized, horizontal
international legal system. Though at this moment of history nation-states
continue to be primary participants, other non-state actors, including
international organizations and individuals, are playing increasingly
important roles. These non-state participants make claims across state
lines with the object of maximizing values.
In subsequent chapters, the author effectively demonstrates how
international law (as a process) can be used to address difficult problems
in areas such as the allocation of jurisdictional competence, exceptions to
jurisdictional competence, the definition and application of self-
determination, the allocation and exploitation of natural resources, the
determination of state accountability and liability, and the determination
of the norms governing the resolution of disputes and the use of force by
individual states and by the United Nations.
The author deals with the subject of "international law and national
law," which is customarily treated at the beginning part of a textbook,
19. Statute of International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
20. HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 37.
21. Id. at 38.
22. Id. at 49.
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near the end of Problems and Process23 and in connection with the role of
national courts in the international legal process. This novel arrangement,
as the author intended, has the benefit of facilitating students'
understanding of the relationship between national and international law
after having obtained substantive knowledge about international law.
Another innovative feature of this book is its treatment of the concepts of
"equity" and "proportionality." Although these concepts are not
"substantive norms" of international law, they are frequently invoked by
judges, practitioners, and scholars. Hence, the author's study of the
content of these concepts and appraisal of their role in "oiling the wheels
of international law" are both illuminating and interesting.24
Particularly compelling is the author's discussion of the role of
international law in defining and protecting human rights. Because
individuals are no longer mere objects of international law but are
participants in the international legal process, they do make transnational
claims and invoke international prescriptions for the protection and
fulfillment of values.
Moreover, the perception of international law as process helps in
determining what human rights are. Those who see international law as
a body of rules argue that human rights are "to be found in the various
international instruments[,] and that whatever rights they contain and
designate as human rights are thereby human rights, at least for the
ratifying parties," and "may in time become reflected in customary
international law."' If international law is understood as a dynamic
process, "international instruments are just the vehicle for expressing the
obligation and providing the detail about the way in which the human right
is to be guaranteed."26 Thus, "[i]t is an interaction of demands by various
actors, and state practice in relation thereto, that leads to the generation
of norms and the expectation of compliance in relation to them."27 The
status of a provision as a human right should therefore "be judged by
reference to the authoritative nature of the sources that purport to identify
it, by community expectation that an obligation exists."28
23. See id. ch. 12.
24. Id. at 219.
25. Id. at 99.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 102.
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On the highly contentious issue of the universality versus cultural
relativism of human rights, Professor Higgins is emphatic in her
commitment to universality. In her words:
It is sometimes suggested that there can be no fully universal
concept of human rights, for it is necessary to take into account
the diverse cultures and political systems of the world. In my
view this is a point advanced mostly by states, and by liberal
scholars anxious not to impose the Western view of things on
others. It is rarely advanced by the oppressed, who are only too
anxious to benefit from perceived universal standards. The non-
universal, relativist view of human rights is in fact a very state-
centered view and loses sight of the fact that human rights are
human rights and not dependent on the fact that states, or
groupings of states, may behave differently from each other so
far as their politics, economic policy, and culture are concerned.
I believe, profoundly, in the universality of the human spirit.
Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to have
sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practise
their own religion or to abstain from religious belief; to feel that
their person is not threatened by the state; to know that they will
not be tortured, or detained without charge, and that, if charged,
they will have a fair trial. I believe there is nothing in these
aspirations that is dependent upon culture, or religion, or stage
of development. They are as keenly felt by the African
tribesman as by the European city-dweller, by the inhabitant of
a Latin American shanty-town as by the resident of a Manhattan
apartment.29
On the related and complex issue of self-determination and minorities,
the author is extremely careful in her response to the claims "that
minorities are entitled to self-determination, and that self-determination
entails secession. "30 Expressing her deep concern for "national unity" and
"territorial integrity," and drawing on the experience of the Committee on
Human Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (minority rights are individual rights under Article 27 of the
Covenant), she responds to both claims in the negative and emphasizes
29. Id. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 121.
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that self-determination is not linked only to "independence." 3' This
reviewer, while in general agreement with the author on most of the issues
raised in this book, would take exception to this position.
As amply demonstrated in the Baltic states, in the former Soviet
Union, and in the former Yugoslavia, the right of self-determination has
moved from the era of decolonization to the era of secession or the era of
democracy. That the right of self-determination today embraces the right
of secession can thus be taken for granted. The critical question is the
appropriate criteria by which to appraise a claim for self-determination.
It is essential, in deciding whether to support or reject a claim for
self-determination in the form of secession, to take all of the relevant
community policies into account. On the one hand, there is a fundamental
human rights policy for freedom of choice, for individuals to form and to
identify themselves with groups that can give them optimum fulfillment in
power and all other values. On the other hand, there is a basic policy in
defense of territorial integrity and a viable political community. How
these two basic policies can be harmonized in a way to serve the common
interests of the world community is the question at the heart of
international self-determination policy.
It is important to remember that a demand for self-determination and
a decision to grant, support, or reject that demand will have ramifications,
not only for the aspiring group demanding self-determination, but also for
the community of which the group is a part, the regional community, and
the world community. Hence, in a particular context, the aggregate value
consequences for all of the affected groups and communities, potential as
well as existing, should be subjected to rigorous contextual scrutiny. This
can be done by reference to all factors relevant to a particular context: the
participants involved and their perspectives (patterns of demands,
expectations, and identification); the situations of interaction (geographical,
temporal, institutional, and crisis factors); the available base values; the
strategies employed; and the outcomes sought and probable effects. After
fully estimating the relative costs and benefits of the different options for
each of the affected communities, the option that will promote the largest
net aggregate of common interests should be supported and honored.32
In squarely confronting various difficult issues, Professor Higgins has
sought to "fit different pieces together." She has succeeded remarkably
in this endeavor. In dealing with particular problems, the author has
31. Id. at 124-25.
32. For further elaboration, see CHEN, supra note 6, ch. 2; Lung-chu Chen, Self-
Determination and Word Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1287 (1991).
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exhibited a characteristic balance in presenting both pros and cons and in
clearly articulating her own views-which are animated by both policy and
doctrine, seasoned by both idealism and pragmatism, and tempered by
both stability and change. Throughout the book, difficult international law
problems are sharply identified and formulated; basic policy considerations
are clearly articulated; the trends of past decisions are carefully described
and analyzed; the factors affecting past decisions are incisively examined;
probable future developments are realistically contemplated; and the
exploration and recommendations of alternative interpretations and
positions are judiciously executed to further common interests in light of
process, policy, doctrine, and context.
In conclusion, the reviewer cannot resist sharing the author's
enthusiasm for international law: "International law is a process for
resolving problems. And it is a great and exciting adventure." 33 Indeed,
the book is a great contribution to the literature of contemporary
international law and should be required reading for all those who are
concerned with international law and affairs-specialists and non-specialists
alike.
33. HiGGiNs, supra note 1, at 267.
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